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[232] Speight (2019:235) has recently raised the question, which he himself leaves 
unanswered, of how naturalism relates to spirit in Hegel’s philosophy of art.1 ‘Naturalism’ 
denotes an explanation that invokes aspects of nature that are (allegedly) irreducible or resistant 
to thought. I call nature ‘stubborn’ insofar as it evinces resistance to its being formed by thought 
and hence to its being united with it. This paper argues that §§556, 558 and 560 of Hegel’s 
Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (hereafter Encyclopedia) answer Speight’s 
question by specifying three elements of nature that, first, are present in art and, second, are 
resistant to thought. These are materiality, natural form, and genius. They exhibit nature’s 
stubbornness in art. This stubbornness, I argue, is what justifies Hegel’s claim that art is 
absolute spirit only implicitly (§556), which leads to the claim that art needs to be superseded 
by religion and philosophy. In this way, Speight’s question receives a precise answer. 
 I proceed as follows. First, I discuss the merit of the Encyclopedia’s philosophy of art 
in contradistinction to Hegel’s lectures on the same topic (Section 13.1). This discussion is 
propelled by the fact that the Encyclopedia’s section on art has been largely overlooked in 
favour of these lectures, which, despite being sometimes helpful in deciphering some of the 
concepts and claims Hegel employs in the Encyclopedia, are not as reliable a guide to Hegel’s 
own thinking about art’s place in the system as the Encyclopedia. Even Gethmann-Siefert’s 
(1991, 2000, 2005) celebrated work on Hegel’s philosophy of art reads the Encyclopedia’s 
section on art through the lenses furnished by the lectures. Contra standard practice, the present 
                                                        
1 All in-text stand-alone paragraph numbers are to Enz. III. Most translations are mine; if they are taken from 
PHM, I indicate it accordingly. I refer only to the paragraph numbers (not to the pages) of the Encyclopedia.     
 
paper advances an interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy of art based entirely on the 
Encyclopedia. 
 [233] Second, since art is placed in the system and, more precisely, determined as 
absolute spirit, I sketch the basic picture of the system and absolute spirit’s status in it (Section 
13.2).  
 Third, I interpret §556 in terms of Hegel’s understanding of intuition, the ideal and 
beauty. I argue that, for Hegel, there are moments in the reception of art when material 
givenness or sheer materiality (a manifestation of what Hegel calls “natural immediacy”) 
nullifies the experience of the unity of thought and nature or “the idea”) (Section 13.3).   
 Fourth, I analyze §558, arguing that, for Hegel, what is received in art is not only 
materiality but also a natural form which is distinct from the idea (and hence another 
manifestation of “natural immediacy”). Pace Peters (2015), I contend that this paragraph leaves 
the issue of whether this natural form is exclusively the human form unsettled (Section 13.4).   
 Fifth, I turn to §560, and argue that, for Hegel, there are moments in the production of 
art when the artist’s genius (another manifestation of “natural immediacy”) liquidates the idea’s 
universality (Section 13.5).  
 These discussions are meant to reinforce the following two claims. First, pace Adorno 
(2002:61-78), natural immediacy or sheer nature (i.e. nature as being resistant to thought, 
nature’s stubbornness) is, for Hegel, essential to art. Second, art’s natural immediacy is the 
exact reason why art is not fully or explicitly absolute spirit: art is only partially or implicitly 
absolute spirit. Since nature does not yield completely to the idea (the unity of thought and 
nature) in art, thought must move on to religion and philosophy in order to fully become 
absolute spirit. 
 
13.1. The Textual Locus of Hegel’s Philosophy of Art 
Comments about art occur in the whole of the Hegel corpus, but the main discussion transpires 
in two places: (a) in his various lectures on the philosophy of art (hereafter Lectures) and (b) 
in the “Philosophy of Spirit,” the Encyclopedia’s third part. Hegel delivered five lecture series 
on the philosophy of art, the first in Heidelberg in 1818 and the rest in Berlin: in 1820/21, 1823, 
1826 and 1828/29. No lecture text penned by Hegel himself has survived (save a few 
fragments) but lengthy student manuscripts (transcripts and lecture notes) are available. 
Depending on the manuscript one surveys, one can enjoy detailed reflections on art’s value, its 
historical development, and the individual arts.  
 
 In contrast to the Lectures’ lengthy expositions, the Encyclopedia’s consideration of art 
is only a few pages long. Hegel published the Encyclopedia three times in his lifetime (1817, 
1827, 1830) and each subsequent [234] version contains a modification of the section on art 
(see Gethmann-Siefert 2000 and Speight 2019 for details). I will concentrate on the 1830 
version, which submits Hegel’s final word on the philosophy of art. 
 Length is not the sole difference between the Encyclopedia’s and the Lectures’ 
philosophy of art. Whereas the Encyclopedia spotlights art’s systematic relation to thought, 
nature, and spirit, the Lectures focus instead on unsystematic questions concerning art’s value, 
its relation to morality, its historical development, and the individual arts. But despite these 
variations there is no discrepancy between them. They are rather complementary, each 
shedding light both on the same and on different aspects of art. The Lectures can be helpful in 
unravelling some of the concepts and claims Hegel utilizes in the Encyclopedia.  
 Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that we cannot fathom Hegel’s conception of art 
by staying only within the Lectures, for art’s systematic character is addressed properly only in 
the Encyclopedia. Thus, I find Gethmann-Siefert’s take of the relation between the Lectures 
and the Encyclopedia somewhat precarious. She advocates that each edition of the 
Encyclopedia’s philosophy of art is nothing but a summary of “the essential thoughts” of the 
preceding lecture series (Gethmann -Siefert 2000:317). She does not, however, make a 
compelling case for such a strong claim (Gethmann-Siefert 2000:322-329). In my view, the 
Encyclopedia’s section on art tends toward a systematic exposition that is foreign to the 
Lectures. 
 It is true that the Encyclopedia was meant to operate as a textbook for Hegel’s lectures, 
but does not hold, as Gethmann-Siefert conjectures, that it was meant as a textbook for his 
lectures on the philosophy of art. The Encyclopedia’s goal was to give a concise presentation 
of Hegel’s system, not of his philosophy of art. Because she takes the Encyclopedia’s section 
on art to be a summary of Hegel’s lectures on the philosophy of art, Gethmann-Siefert makes 
no effort to decipher that cryptic section on its own terms. Relying heavily on the Lectures, the 
early Jena writings, and the 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit, she ends up paying only minimal 
attention to the Encyclopedia’s passages and, especially, their own systematic interconnection. 
She certainly does not perceive them as fundamental for understanding Hegel’s philosophy of 
art. Contra Gethmann-Siefert’s work, the present paper focuses exclusively on the 
Encyclopedia’s philosophy of art, hence on Hegel’s concern about art’s role in the system. This 
is why I will make only scarce use of the Lectures and illuminate the Encyclopedia’s section 
on art by drawing thickly on preceding sections of the Encyclopedia.  
 
 Finally, it should be mentioned that, in the English-speaking world, the bulk of 
scholarly work on Hegel’s philosophy of art is based almost [235] uniquely on H. G. Hotho’s 
posthumous three-volume edition of Hegel’s lectures on the philosophy of art (Hotho 1842). A 
translation in exquisite English was published by T. M. Knox in 1975 under the title Hegel’s 
Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art. Aside from a few notable exceptions (see especially James 
2009, Peters 2015, Speight 2015, and Speight 2015, 2019), the Encyclopedia’s section on art 
has almost never been given central place in accounts of Hegel’s philosophy of art in the 
English-speaking world. As Gaiger (2006:160) observes, Hotho’s 1842 edition and the Knox 
translation have long been treated as “the standard edition” by Pippin, Houlgate, and other 
leading Hegel scholars. 
 Since well-grounded doubts about the validity of Hotho’s work were raised by 
Gethmann-Siefert as early as 1991, the continued usage of Hotho’s edition in the English-
speaking world is problematic. For instance, Hotho approached the student manuscripts of 
these lectures as nothing but “sketches and observations” requiring expansion and re-
organization. In his Vorrede he writes that his goal is to restore the Lectures’ “animating inner 
life” by “structuring the whole,” adding missing “dialectical transitions,” tightening up “loose 
connections,” and increasing the number of examples (Gaiger 2006:162-163, Gethmann-
Siefert 1991:93). Hotho also augmented the text with thoughts that were meant “to demonstrate 
the superiority of Hegel’s aesthetics in face of [...] rival systems” (Gaiger 2006:163). The 
outcome of this “restoration” was a massive expansion of the student manuscripts, the most 
detailed of which does not exceed 300 pages; Hotho’s edition, by contrast, runs nearly 1,600 
pages. As Gaiger (2006:163) notes, “it is now almost impossible to work out exactly what 
belongs to Hegel and what was introduced by Hotho” and hence Hotho’s edition belongs to the 
corpus of the reception history of Hegel’s ideas rather than to the Hegel corpus itself (cf. 
Speight 2019:226 n. 4). Given these reasons and that English-speaking scholarship on Hegel’s 
aesthetics has in the main treated Hotho’s edition as “the standard text,” it would not be an 
exaggeration to suggest that this scholarship should seek a new beginning.   
            
13.2. The System 
The Encyclopedia gives a comprehensive, but terse, presentation of Hegel’s account of “the 
absolute.” The absolute is the whole of being and has three fundamental dimensions: “thought,” 
“nature,” and “spirit.” Thought is studied by logic, nature by the philosophy of nature, and 
spirit by the philosophy of spirit. Each fundamental dimension is constituted by an [236] array 
of lesser dimensions. Specifying the relations between the various lesser dimensions within a 
 
fundamental one, as well as between the three fundamental dimensions themselves, is the 
Encyclopedia’s task. 
 Thought consists of categories or concepts, which are mental or “inner” elements 
generating meaning. Hegel, contra Kant, believes categories induce meaning even when they 
are unrelated to materiality, externality, or sensibility. Logic demonstrates how this is done. 
Thus, in logic thought proves to be an immaterial structure. 
 Nature has two components. On the one hand, it consists of categories and concepts 
(i.e. thought) as they apply, as functions of organization, to materiality, externality, or 
sensibility. There is, then, a facet of nature appearing as an organized and hence meaningful 
structure. On the other hand, nature consists of elements given to the categories and concepts 
of nature by materiality, externality, or sensibility. This second facet of nature, which is 
unorganized and hence meaningless, is what I call “sheer nature.” Although Hegel’s 
Naturphilosophie is interested mainly in showing how thought shapes materiality into 
meaningful structures of nature, it acknowledges sheer nature’s existence.  
 Spirit differs from both thought and nature, yet it involves them both. It is not simply 
the concepts and categories organizing nature and it is not simply organized materiality. Spirit, 
rather, is thought’s consciousness of its finding or “knowing” itself in nature, or, more 
specifically, thought’s consciousness of its being the organizing element in nature. Philosophy 
of spirit narrates the emergence of such consciousness. 
 Spirit has three dimensions: subjective, objective, and absolute spirit. As subjective 
spirit, thought thinks of itself in nature as an organizing material structure (either as organ(s) 
or as physical process(es), such as perception and intuition). This form of thought’s self-
consciousness in nature is defective: by reducing itself to materiality, what thought encounters 
in nature is only sheer nature. As objective spirit, thought posits itself in nature and thereby 
becomes an object for itself. Thought’s self-positing in nature contrasts with its already being 
in nature as a material thing. The problem with objective spirit is that nature vanishes and all 
that appears is thought. Finally, as absolute spirit, thought can be neither its self-positing in 
nature alone nor a material structure alone. The challenge for absolute spirit is to find a way to 
combine thought with nature without annihilating any one of these at any moment.   
 Art is one of absolute spirit’s three dimensions, the other two being religion and 
philosophy. It follows (1) that art, religion and philosophy are modes of thought’s self-
consciousness in nature that, contra objective spirit, [237] allow nature’s otherness. It also 
follows (2) that they are modes of thought’s self-consciousness in nature that, contra subjective 
spirit, do not reduce thought to a material thing. In the remainder of the paper I focus on §§556, 
 
558, and 560 of the Encyclopedia, seeking to explain how exactly these two fundamental 
characterizations of absolute spirit apply specifically to art. 
 
13.3. Intuition, Ideal, and Beauty (§556) 
In §556 Hegel lays out art’s minimum, most superficial structure. There is (a) the artwork, a 
Dasein external to cognizing subjects and open to common appreciation; (b) the subject 
producing it, the artist; and (c) the subject(s) receiving it, the audience. As soon as this structure 
is laid out, Hegel qualifies it significantly. First, he declares that the artwork’s reception has 
the character of intuition (Anschauung). Second, he asserts that what is intuited is the ideal (das 
Ideal). Third, he maintains that what is intuited has “the shape of beauty” (die Gestalt der 
Schönheit). In the present section I unpack these three statements.  
 I. Intuition: In §449 Hegel defines intuition, a form of subjective spirit, as thought’s 
“recollecting” itself in an externally existing material in which it remains sunk (versenkt). 
Thought’s remaining sunk in externality is crucial, as suggested by its being repeated in the 
Zusatz of §450. 
 The Zusatz of §449 clarifies this definition by differentiating intuition from 
representation and sensation. On the one hand, while in both representation and intuition “the 
object is both separate from me and simultaneously mine,” that the object is mine is explicit in 
representation but only implicit in intuition. The object’s “mineness,” i.e. thought’s self-
recollection in it, is suppressed in intuition because “in intuition the objecthood 
(Gegenständlichkeit) of the content predominates (überwiegt)” (PHM). This “objecthood” is 
the object’s material givenness. Thus, in intuition thought sees itself in the object but it is 
unaware of this because the object’s material givenness predominates in the subject’s 
experience of the object. 
 On the other hand, while in both sensation and intuition a manifoldness of individual 
features comes to the fore, it is only in intuition that this manifoldness appears as “a totality, 
an abundance of determinations being held together.” Sensation does not unite the 
determinations, intuition does. In [238] Hegel’s words, “in immediate intuition I do have the 
whole object before me.” By uniting the determinations, intuition “grasps the solid substance 
of the object,” something that sensation cannot do because it presents us only with an aggregate, 
a disjointed plurality. This “solid substance” of the object is its meaning. 
 By unifying an object’s manifold determinations, intuition generates meaning in nature. 
This unifying function, Hegel believes, cannot belong to material givenness, to sheer nature, 
but can only belong to thought. It is the thought-in-intuition, not the nature-in-intuition, that 
 
generates meaning in nature. Yet, it is intuition’s peculiarity that in it thought is unaware of its 
own unifying function. The material givenness “predominating” in intuition does not allow 
thought to realize that the unifying element in nature is thought itself, an immaterial, non-
natural element. Because of this deficiency, Hegel writes that “intuition is […] only the 
beginning of cognition” and that “it is a blatant error to believe that one has already true 
knowledge of the thing when one has an immediate intuition of it.” Absolute spirit, which 
sublates subjective spirit and hence intuition, cannot be “an immediate intuition,” to wit, it 
cannot be just intuition. Nevertheless, insofar as absolute spirit is intuition, thought is 
dominated by sheer nature and thereby fails to behold itself as the unifying element in nature.  
 Since intuition characterizes art’s reception, art is located in materiality, externality, 
and sensibility. Art is determined fundamentally by a material external object’s being given to 
the audience’s senses. Yet, given the nature of intuition, what the audience receives is not only 
a manifoldness of determinations, but also a unified manifoldness, a “totality.” The audience 
thus finds meaning in the artwork. This meaning, as we know, cannot derive from the artwork’s 
material givenness – it is thought’s work. Yet, insofar as art’s reception is determined by 
intuition, the audience does not recognize this: they see that the artwork has meaning but they 
do not espy thought as that meaning’s generator. They assume this meaning is in the artwork’s 
material givenness, in its colors, weight, lines, texture, sounds, and so on. In art’s reception 
thought’s function as the unifying element in nature remains hidden from thought. 
 Crucially, however, art is not “an immediate intuition;” it is absolute spirit. Insofar as 
it is absolute spirit, art enables thought to recognize itself in the artwork as the unifying element 
in nature. Thought does see the artwork as its own product, as what it “has posited.” In 
Desmond’s words, art indeed is, for Hegel, “a form of sensuous self-knowledge” (Desmond 
1986: 2).  
 Since art’s reception is both intuition and absolute spirit, it is determined as a 
‘conjunction’ of (a) thought’s being dominated by material [239] givenness (sheer nature) and 
hence being unaware of its presence in nature and (b) thought’s self-recognition in nature. 
These two, though, cannot exist simultaneously: they cancel each other out. Given that they 
both determine art’s reception, they must exist in the latter but not simultaneously. Art’s 
reception is a structure of fluctuation, of becoming: thought moves from self-recognition to 
annihilation, from recognizing itself as the unifying function in nature to being dominated by 
material givenness, and vice versa (see Trisokkas 2012: 110-116). Because of this fluid 
structure art is not fully absolute spirit; it is, rather, as Hegel notes in §556, absolute spirit only 
implicitly (“[art] is the concrete intuition [...] of the implicitly absolute spirit [...]” (PHM). 
 
 This, then, is art’s implicitness as absolute spirit: in art thought finds itself as the 
unifying force in nature, but not constantly. It is art’s distinctiveness that there are moments 
when the artwork’s materiality or “objecthood” – its colours, sounds, lines, texture, mass, 
weight, and so on – “predominates” the audience’s experience. Being fundamentally a realm 
of intuition, art constantly relapses into the dominance of nature over thought. Regardless of 
how hard we try, we cannot avoid being hit by the artwork’s material constitution. The problem 
is that when this happens in art’s reception, thought loses itself in nature. So, art’s reception is 
determined fundamentally by two phenomena: (a) thought “recollecting” itself in materiality, 
externality, and sensibility as the unifying element in nature and (b) this self-recollection being 
constantly interrupted by raw materiality, by a dominant nature that leads thought into 
(momentary) vanishing.  
 II. The Ideal: Hegel’s second statement in §556 is that what is intuited in the artwork is 
absolute spirit as the ideal. Hegel there defines the ideal as “the concrete shape born of 
subjective spirit” in which “natural immediacy is only a sign of the idea” (PHM). On the one 
hand, being born of subjective spirit, the ideal is a material external shape given to the senses. 
On the other hand, as a sign, this shape expresses the idea. What is intuited, then, is a material 
shape that expresses the idea. 
 The idea is defined in §213 as “the absolute unity of concept and objectivity” (Enz. I 
§213). “Concept” is another name for “thought” and “objectivity” is another name for “nature,” 
so the idea is the unity of thought and nature. Hegel writes that objectivity is the idea’s “real 
content” and has “the form of external Dasein” (Enz. I §213). The idea is not about “this” or 
about “representations” or about “external things” (Enz. I §213). [240] It is not an “idea of 
something,” a particular idea (Enz. I §213). The idea, most generally, is the presence of thought 
(“the concept”) in externality, in nature.  
 The definition of the idea as the unity of thought and nature determines the idea as a 
genus and can be qualified in many ways. The idea’s qualification creates its species, which 
express it in subtly different ways (see Enz. I §214). The ideal is one of the idea’s species. As 
ideal, the idea’s concreteness is specifically a material-sensory shape. Since, however, the idea 
is not only concreteness but also the unity of thought and nature, the ideal is an expression of 
this unity in a material-sensory shape. The unity of thought and nature is another name for 
thought’s being the unifying function in nature. 
 What is intuited in the artwork, therefore, is the unity of thought and nature (the 
unification of nature by thought), which is the idea. Yet, in art’s reception absolute spirit is 
 
bound to sensibility and materiality. In Hegel’s own words, “art displays the genuine universal 
or the idea in the form of sensory reality” (§456 Zusatz/PHM). This display is the ideal. 
 III. Beauty: Hegel holds that what is intuited in the artwork’s reception has “the shape 
of beauty.” The ideal, then, has the shape of beauty. This means that art as absolute spirit is 
exclusively beautiful art. In §556 “the shape of beauty” as the ideal’s shape has a twofold 
determination. On the one hand, it is “a sign of the idea.” On the other hand, it is specified “that 
nothing else [other than the idea] is shown in the shape.”  
 “Sign” (Zeichen) is discussed in §§457-458. In the Remark to §457 signs are described 
as “unifications of what is the spirit’s own or its interior with the intuitive” (PHM). A sign 
connects material-sensory concreteness, natural immediacy, with a meaning, an inner element. 
Crucially, the meaning and the sign have a relation of otherness: the sign does not signify itself 
– it is not a structure of self-signification – but, rather, something alien to it. In Hegel’s own 
words, “when intelligence has designated something [as a sign], it has finished with the content 
of intuition and has given the sensory material an alien meaning as its soul” (§457 Zusatz / 
PHM). 
 This interpretation is confirmed by what Hegel writes next in §458: 
 
In this unity, stemming from intelligence, of an independent representation and an intuition, the 
matter of the intuition is of course initially something [241] received, something immediate or given 
(e.g. the colour of the cockade, etc.). But in this identity the intuition does not count as positive or 
as representing itself, but as representing something else. It is an image that has received into itself 
as its soul an independent representation of the intelligence, its meaning. This intuition is the sign. 
(§458/PHM)  
 
Sign, then, is a given material designating a meaning that is an other to it. The meaning 
becomes the material’s “soul” but is “something else” other than it. In the Remark to §458 
Hegel repeats that “in the sign […] the intuition’s own content and the content of which it is a 
sign have nothing to do with each other” (PHM).  
 This description of “sign” is greatly illuminating regarding Hegel’s characterization of 
“the shape of beauty” in §556. His statement that the beautiful shape is “a sign of the idea” can 
only mean that a given sensory material designates an element that is not such a material. This 
element is the idea, the unity of thought and nature or, if you will, thought’s unifying function 
in nature. So, in §556 Hegel states that the beautiful artwork is a natural immediacy, a sensory 
concreteness, opening up this unity. The artwork’s materiality, being a sign, is totally distinct 
from the idea. In art, nature maintains its independence, but thought, nature’s other, is able to 
 
encounter itself in nature as the unifying force therein. Art creates a “space” for the idea’s 
“posited” appearance without losing its naturalness, its givenness, its sensibility altogether.  
 In addition to describing “the shape of beauty” as “a sign of the idea,” Hegel stipulates 
“that nothing else [other than the idea] is shown in the shape.” This means that it is a peculiarity 
of artistic beauty that nothing else, other than the unity of thought and nature, is brought to the 
audience’s awareness. Art as absolute spirit opens up a “space” only for the reception of such 
a unity. All other features of thought and nature disappear from awareness. Thus, a beautiful 
artwork is able to suppress natural elements resisting nature’s unity with thought, to wit, 
elements exemplifying the dominance of material givenness.  
 But we must be very careful here. Given the intuitive character of art’s reception, that 
suppression is only implicit or momentary. Necessarily, then, there are moments when beautiful 
artworks succumb to the brutal forces of material givenness. There are moments when the 
spectator of Praxiteles’s Apollo Sauroktonos does not experience it as the presence of divinity 
(thought) in an anthropomorphic body (nature) but only as a piece of bronze. Beautiful art 
cannot escape from this experience. As Hegel elsewhere puts it, “in beauty the natural element 
– its [i.e. the idea’s] sensuous coefficient – remains” (VPG 308/LPH 261). 
 [242] On the whole, §556 stresses the presence of two conflicting elements in art’s 
reception: intuition and the ideal. As intuition, art suppresses the idea and appears as material 
givenness. As the ideal, art brings to awareness the idea and suppresses material givenness. 
The audience’s experience fluctuates from the one to the other situation. Art is essentially a 
becoming (Werden). As much as we are enthralled by the idea’s presence in the artwork, as 
much as we see it as a sign of thought’s being the unifying force in nature, as much as we feel 
“at home” in art, we will always be met with the harsh realization that the artwork is simply a 
natural immediacy, a raw materiality, an aggregate of colours, sounds, weight, mass, texture, 
hardness, and so on. In the domain of art as absolute spirit brutal naturalism will always come 
back to haunt spirituality. This is why thought eventually must move on to religion and 
philosophy to become fully spiritual. 
 
13.4. Art and Natural Form (§558) 
We have seen that art’s reception is partially determined by material givenness, which is a 
species of natural immediacy. What is received in this way is a material (colours, texture, lines, 
sounds, and so on) destitute of thought and hence of meaning. Thus, insofar as art is specified 
as material givenness, thought disappears from art. Hegel insists that natural immediacy is 
 
present in art’s reception not only as material givenness but also as natural form. Natural form 
is the theme of §558, to which I now turn.      
 As seen, what is received in the beautiful artwork is not only material givenness but 
also a unified material givenness. It is in such a unified structure, resulting from thought’s 
unifying function, that thought finds itself in the artwork. In §558 Hegel identifies the unified 
material givenness with a natural form. This means that, on the one hand, what is presented in 
the artwork is thought’s work but, on the other hand, thought unifies the material in order to 
present a natural immediacy. Apparently, Hegel thinks that only by presenting (darstellen) a 
natural form can beautiful art bring to awareness the unity of thought and nature. 
 Hegel endorses H1 (‘H’ stands for ‘Hegel’), which is a passage from §558:  
 
H1: Art also needs, for the expression of spiritual content, the given forms of nature together with 
their meaning, which art must discern and appropriate (cf. §411). (§558/PHM)  
 
Immediately before H1, Hegel repeats that “art […] needs, for the intuitions to be produced by 
it, an external given material” (§558/PHM). [243] The “also” in H1 thus specifies that, in 
addition to “an external given material,” art needs “the given forms of nature.” Crucially, they 
are needed “for the expression of spiritual content,” for the expression of the idea. 
 These Naturformen have meaning and are therefore distinct from natural immediacy as 
a simply “external given material.” Yet, as we have seen, beautiful art has meaning as absolute 
spirit by being a sign, which is a structure of other-signification. The beautiful artwork, then, 
is a natural immediacy consisting of (a) an external given material and (b) a natural form 
signifying something alien to it. This alien element is, as we already know, the idea. But what 
are these Naturformen which beautiful art presents and which function as signs of the idea?   
 At the end of H1, Hegel refers to §411 as a text which should illuminate H1. §411 
discusses “the actual soul.” The actual soul, he informs us, is the soul (or thought or 
intelligence) permeating a body so fully that this body’s appearance immediately shows it as 
having a soul, as being a body that thinks, or, again, as being a unity of soul (thought) and body 
(nature). This does not mean that the body collapses into the unity of body and soul. Hegel 
writes that in actual soul the “externality [of bodiliness] represents not itself, but the soul of 
which it is the sign” (§411/PHM). Given Hegel’s definition of “sign,” this means there is still 
a distinction between the body, as the signifier, and the unity of body and soul, as the signified.2  
                                                        
2 Peters (2015: 33) argues that the actual soul is a self-signifying sign: “Hegel holds that the actual soul constitutes 
an identity of inner and outer; hence the actual soul as sign does not signify something other than itself.” To square 
 
 The body as natural immediacy remains devoid of thought. Nevertheless, even though 
the body is sheer nature, it is also pervaded by the soul, an element of thought. Our senses are 
affected by sheer bodiliness, but insofar as it is part of the actual soul, the body acts as a sign, 
bringing forth the soul pervading it. Given Hegel’s reference to §411 in H1, it is justifiable to 
interpret “the given forms of nature” as instances of the actual soul: bodies appearing as signs 
of the soul. If this holds, then, solely the basis of H1, one understands that beautiful art presents 
any body immediately expressing its unity with soul. The presented body would be “the given 
form of nature,” [244] that species of natural immediacy (distinct from the artwork’s material 
givenness) acting as a sign of the unity of thought and nature. 
 In the Remark of §558 Hegel declares that H1 “takes care of the principle of the 
imitation of nature in art” (PHM), namely, that an item is an artwork if, and only if, it imitates 
nature. In Hegel’s view, this principle is not completely true because beautiful art should 
“imitate” only that dimension of nature acting immediately as a “sign” of its unity with thought 
(cf. Peters 2015:41-42 and Desmond 1986:1-13). Nature “taken only in its externality” (my 
emphasis), as an element devoid of thought, offers nothing to art as absolute spirit. It is only 
when nature becomes a “meaningful natural form signifying the spirit” that nature has value 
for art as absolute spirit, for it is only in this case that thought can find itself in nature. Beautiful 
art should “imitate” bodies, but only bodies that are actual souls.          
 This interpretation of §411 and hence of H1 can be partially challenged. Hegel 
concludes §411 by stating that the actual soul has “human […] expression.” If the actual soul 
has only a human form, H1 must be understood as saying that beautiful art presents – not any 
body but – solely the human body. This claim, however, does not fit with passage H2, which 
immediately follows H1:  
 
H2: Among such formations (Unter den Gestaltungen) the human is the highest (die höchste) and 
truthful (wahrhafte) formation […]. (§558)  
 
If we identify “such formations” with H1’s “the given forms of nature” that “art needs for the 
expression of spiritual content,” which is the obvious option, H2 clearly forbids the 
                                                        
her interpretation with Hegel’s divergent account of “sign” Peters simply discards it and suggests that regarding 
the actual soul Hegel has in mind “a peculiar kind of sign,” “a special kind of sign,” a sign that “cannot be 
understood as a sign in the narrow sense of the term” (Peters 2015: 32-34, 40). The problem is that Hegel never 
talks of kinds of sign, something that eventually leads Peters to describe his statement that the body is a sign of 
the soul as “odd” (Peters 2015: 33). My interpretation saves Hegel’s account from oddity since it takes the actual 
soul as being an other-signifying structure, not a self-signifying structure: the body signifies the unity of body and 
soul, which is distinct from the signifying body. 
 
identification of the given natural forms with solely the human form. It refers to a plurality of 
natural forms that express “spiritual content” and states that the human is only one of these 
forms. The combination of H1 and H2 characterizes beautiful art as an activity presenting not 
only the human form but also other natural forms that are actual souls (whatever these may be).  
 Yet, H2 does inform us that the human form is the highest of those forms and the 
“truthful” one. This creates a hierarchy of natural forms, at the top of which sits the human 
form. If beautiful art covers the whole spectrum of this hierarchy, it is divided into “the highest 
art,” which presents the human form, and lower species of art, presenting non-human natural 
forms. In this case, beautiful art as a whole would not be anthropocentric, but the highest 
beautiful art would be.   
 Yet again, this interpretation is undermined by passage H3, immediately following H2 
(I repeat H2 in the brackets): [245]   
 
H3: [Among such formations the human is the highest and truthful formation] because only in the 
human formation can spirit have its bodiliness and hence its intuitable expression. (§558) 
 
H3 undermines H2 because whereas H2 informs us that spiritual content is “expressed” by both 
non-human natural forms and the human natural form, H3 tells us that only the human form 
can express it. We have reached an interpretative impasse that §558 leaves unresolved. 
 Peters (2015:9, 17-38, 49) utilizes evidence from the Lectures and the “Anthropology” 
section of the Encyclopedia in order to defend her thesis that, for Hegel, the human form is the 
sole “shape of beauty.” I find Peters’s arguments convincing (especially those based on Hotho 
1823:36, 157-158) and hence I agree with her thesis. Nevertheless, pace Peters (2015:41-42), 
§558 does not support this thesis. Since the present paper focuses on the Encyclopedia’s section 
on art, it is certainly important to know that it allows for a (lower) beautiful art that presents 
non-human natural forms.    
 Independently of how this issue could be resolved, Peters is, in my view, mistaken to 
present the human form as a self-signifying sign (Peters 2015:40). For Hegel, the human form 
is a sign of the idea in the precise sense that the human body, a natural immediacy, a natural 
form devoid of soul, brings forth what is other than it, the unity of body and soul. The beautiful 
artwork, by presenting the human form, allows thought (the soul) to “see” itself in what is other 
than itself. In art as absolute spirit the otherness of the presented body (sheer nature) appears 
equally as strongly as the idea signified by it. Thus, nature is stubborn in art not only as 
material givenness but also as a presented natural form, as a depicted sheer (human) body.  
 
 In his Aesthetic Theory, Adorno criticizes Hegel for treating art in such a way that nature 
loses therein all its independence. In his view, Hegel develops a “language of art” that replaces 
the “language of nature” (Adorno 2002:77). Nature is “repressed” in art (Adorno 2002:61), 
being subsumed under the influence of the “subject,” “spirit” or “thought.” For Adorno, Hegel 
thinks that in art “nothing in the world is worthy of attention except that for which the 
autonomous subject has itself to thank” (Adorno 2002:62). In this way, in art nature is ruled by 
“the dark shadow of idealism” (Adorno 2002:62). Art has been “liberated” “from the 
heteronomy of the material, especially of natural objects” and “expunged” from itself “the 
rawness of what is unmediated by spirit” (Adorno 2002:63). Adorno’s message is clear: Hegel 
treats art as a domain in which nature is completely subordinated to thought.   
 Our discussion has shown the mendacity of Adorno’s critique. For Hegel, although 
nature is not thoroughly dominant in art, it is partially [246] or momentarily dominant. For 
him, in art nature is not fully sublated by thought. While art is absolute spirit, it is not fully or 
explicitly absolute spirit, since there are moments when thought is dominated by nature: there 
are moments when thought vanishes completely in art. As Desmond remarks, in art nature 
“refuses to be appropriated without residue” (Desmond 1986:5-6). This “residue” is nature’s 
material givenness, the given natural forms, and, as we shall now witness, the artist’s genius. 
     
13.5. Beauty and Genius (§560) 
In the last two sections, I discussed the twofold manifestation of nature’s stubbornness 
(“natural immediacy”) in Hegel’s conception of art’s reception: even though the audience does 
experience the idea in the artwork and thereby thought finds itself therein as the unifying 
function in nature, this finding is only implicit (i.e., momentary), since there are moments when 
material givenness and the presented natural form interrupt that experience. In §560 Hegel 
turns his attention from art’s reception to its production: besides being received by an audience, 
the artwork is “something made by the artist” (§560/PHM). In the present section I argue that 
analogously with art’s reception, which is determined by “the one-sidedness of [natural] 
immediacy in the ideal” (§560), namely by material givenness and natural form, art’s 
production is marked by a similar stubbornness or “one-sidedness.” This “one-sidedness” is 
owed to the artist’s genius.  
 We have seen that in art as absolute spirit, the artwork is received as “the shape of 
beauty” and that an inherent determination of this shape is that it exemplifies only the idea. It 
is in this way that the beautiful shape is a perfection. It has also been ascertained that, regarding 
at least the highest beautiful art, the beautiful shape is the human form. Since what the audience 
 
must receive from the highest beautiful art is the human form exclusively as the unity of thought 
and nature (the idea), the artist, who “transfigures” the idea in the shape, must ensure “that 
nothing else is shown in the shape” than that unity (§556).  
 For Hegel, “thought” is a universal structure (Trisokkas 2009). For this reason, when 
thought is united with nature, what is presented is universal, an element devoid of 
particularities, individual feelings, eccentricities, and so on. So, in the beautiful artwork, as 
Wicks (1993:367) puts it, “all contingencies in appearance must be eliminated to the greatest 
extent such as to allow the universality of this content to exhibit itself through the image.” In 
the Encyclopedia Hegel relates this demand for universality in beautiful art with [247] the fact 
that it is presented and addressed to a community. Beautiful art must be able to “speak” to all 
in a community, so the artist must seek to express a universal idea, an idea that can “touch” 
and be significant for everyone (cf. LFA I:7. 11, 30). Precisely because the beautiful artwork 
is “a work of external common reality” (§556/PHM), the idea the artist “builds into” (einbilden) 
it must be a universality, an idea the whole community will recognize as the unity of thought 
and nature.  
 In the most beautiful artworks the idea is expressed through the human form. It follows 
that the human form presented by the most beautiful artworks must not include elements 
destroying the idea’s universality. The artist, therefore, should not simply choose an actual 
human being and present her in the artwork; she must rather purify actual beautiful human 
forms, abstract from their deficiencies, and thereby present a perfect human form as a sign of 
the idea (Peters 2015:45, 48, 57; Wicks 1993:366-368). According to Peters (2015:44), for 
Hegel, such perfect human forms would be the figures of Greek gods and Christian saints. 
 This is how Hegel expresses this demand for universality (or perfection) in art in §560: 
 
The subject is the formality of activity and the artwork is an expression of God only when there is 
no sign of subjective particularity in it, and the content of the indwelling spirit has conceived and 
brought itself forth into the world, without admixture and unsullied by its contingency. (§560/PHM, 
my emphasis)  
 
The expression “the subject is the formality of activity” has a twofold sense. On the one hand, 
the subject, namely the artist, is the “formal” cause of the artwork in that she builds a natural 
form into a material. On the other hand, she is a “formality” in that what is built into the material 
is universal, an idea devoid of particularities and contingencies. The word “God,” I maintain, 
is equivalent to the expression “the absolute,” which denotes a structure defined by the idea. 
 
God, simply, is, for Hegel, the unity of thought and nature. So, when he writes that “the 
[beautiful] artwork is an expression of God,” he claims that the beautiful artwork expresses the 
unity of thought and nature. 
 Since this unity is a universal structure, the beautiful artwork can express it only if the 
artist can manage to remove any “sign of subjective particularity in it.” If, contrastingly, the 
artwork becomes a sign of “subjective particularity,” of peculiarities belonging to the artist 
who produced it, it stops being “the shape of beauty” and expressing “God” or the idea. Nothing 
other than the idea must be shown in the artwork and the artist’s subjective particularity, [248] 
upon entering the artwork, blocks that showing. Subjective particularity generates 
“contingency,” which destroys the idea’s universality, and, therefore, the artist must build the 
idea into the artwork “without admixture” and “unsullied” by the contingency of her own 
subjective particularity. 
 In my understanding of §560, Hegel is adamant that this goal of the creator of beautiful 
artworks, the creation of a perfection, never materializes. Unlike the philosopher and, to a lesser 
degree, the genuine believer, the artist lacks the capacity to free herself completely from her 
subjective particularities. The freedom of thinking or genuine faith is higher than the freedom 
of artistic production. When Hegel writes that “freedom only advances as far as thinking” 
(§560/PHM), he implies that freedom from subjective particularity follows a progression from 
art to religion to philosophy: only in philosophy this freedom maximizes itself and in art it 
remains limited by the artist’s subjectivity particularity.  
 What is it that limits the artist’s freedom from subjective particularity? Hegel could not 
be any clearer: this obstructive element is her “inspiration,” which derives from her “genius.” 
The beautiful artwork is permeated not only by the idea or the rational thinking the artist 
employs in order to build the idea into the artwork, but also by “the inspiration of the artist,” 
which is “an unfree passion, like an alien power within the artist” (§560/PHM). “Inspiration” 
is a source of “subjective particularity” and hence affects the artwork as an expression of 
absolute spirit negatively. This is so because it interrupts the expression of a universality (the 
idea) with expressions of peculiarities belonging to the artist.  
 Hegel writes that inspiration is “an alien power within the artist.” By this he means it 
cannot be controlled by thought: it is stubborn. While the artist is indeed able to create an 
artwork that expresses an idea that “speaks” to all in the same way, this is not always so: there 
are moments when her inspiration does not succumb to thought, presenting elements that are 
peculiar, emotive, and contingent. Just as material givenness and natural form undermine 
thought in art’s reception, so does inspiration in art’s production. 
 
 Hegel’s aim is to make us realize the stubbornness of nature in art’s production. It is a 
fundamental trait of art’s production that the artist cannot remove her “subjective particularity,” 
her “inspiration,” from “the shape of beauty” she produces. The artist’s “labour” is torn 
between (a) an application of what Hegel calls “technical intelligence and mechanical 
externalities” (§560/PHM), which are rational tools enabling the expression of a universality, 
and (b) an application of elements that are [249] peculiar to the artist’s character or 
craftsmanship. The inspired artist, the creator of beautiful artworks, mixes rational thinking 
and skilled workmanship with her individual passions and cosmotheory in the process of 
artistic production. This becomes a problem for art as absolute spirit, precisely because the 
latter discloses a universal structure, a structure that does not permit, even momentarily, the 
complete annihilation of universality by the particular, the emotive, and the contingent.  
 Hegel concludes §560 with the following: 
 
“[T]he producing has in itself the form of natural immediacy, it belongs to the genius as this 
particular subject […]. The artwork therefore is just as much a work of free arbitrariness (freien 
Willkür), and the artist is the master of God.” (§560/PHM) 
 
Hegel uses “genius” as an umbrella term incorporating subjective particularity, inspiration, and 
passion. He suggests that when the artist produces a beautiful artwork, she is both a genius and 
a skilled worker guided by her rationality (note the “just as much” in the quotation). The crucial 
point is the link between genius and natural immediacy. The artwork cannot escape 
particularity and arbitrariness precisely because genius infiltrates it with natural immediacy. 
Genius is the reason why art is absolute spirit only implicitly from the side of art’s production 
as well. 
 I have claimed that genius is what interrupts the expression of the unity of thought and 
nature in art’s production by allowing nature to stand alone therein, cut off from thought (even 
if momentarily). This reading is ratified by what Hegel says about “genius” in the Zusatz of 
§395. This Zusatz presents genius as a “natural determinacy” of the individual soul. The latter 
has a variety of natural determinacies, but genius is the lowest or most natural. In contrast to 
temperament, character and idiosyncrasy, genius involves nothing extraneous to sheer nature, 
nothing coming from thought: it is a physical processing, an instance of subjective spirit. 
Genius, Hegel claims, is “a determinate direction which the individual spirit has acquired from 
nature.” For this reason, genius appertains wholly to “the sphere of the accidental.” One artist 
differs from another precisely because each is determined by a different genius, a peculiar 
 
element given to them at their birth. Consequently, each beautiful artwork contains something 
differentiating it from another: the accidentality of genius sires the accidental diverse features 
of beautiful artworks.  
 All in all, §560 attests that art’s production is not fully absolute spirit: it is not a perfect 
expression of the unity of thought and nature. It does express absolute spirit but only implicitly. 
The artist, equipped with “technical [250] intelligence and mechanical externalities,” builds 
into the artwork the principles of her community that allow its members to experience the idea. 
But it is an attribute of great artists that they are geniuses. Genius functions as a source of 
natural immediacy, of sheer nature: it infiltrates the artwork with the artist’s subjective 
particularity, her passions, feelings and eccentricities. This does not mean that the beautiful 
artwork cannot open up a “space” for the ideal; it only means that there are moments when the 
audience’s experience of the idea is interrupted by impressions of the peculiarities the artist has 
built into the artwork. The experience of the artwork fluctuates between the experience of the 
universal idea and the experience of the artist’s subjective particularity; it is a becoming. This 
is caused by the fact that the artist is both a rational craftsman and a genius. This makes art 
absolute spirit only implicitly, for there are moments when sheer nature (genius) dominates the 
unity of thought and nature. Exactly in these moments, Hegel exclaims, “the artist is the master 
of God.”  
    
13.6. Conclusion 
The paper has given a precise answer to Speight’s question of how naturalism (nature’s 
stubbornness) relates to spirit in Hegel’s philosophy of art: the stubbornness of nature (a) is 
present in art as material givenness, natural form, and genius; and (b) is the exact reason why 
art is absolute spirit only implicitly and must therefore be superseded by religion and 
philosophy.  
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